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the suspension of disbelief on the part of the reader. On the contrary, Eggers uses the familiar and the everyday to create a portrait of one possible future, and this is what makes it such a compelling -and disturbing -story. Driven by enterprises such as WikiLeaks and Transparency International, 'transparency' has become a metonym for 'democracy', and as Gallie (1956) argued many years ago, these are stealthy words that shift between fact and value. To say that something 'is' democratic is also to say that the something in question is 'good' or 'better' than something else. Similarly, to argue for greater transparency is to argue on behalf of democracy in the name of accountability; it is a way of saying that no person, corporation, or government should be above the law. However, new forms of control are emerging that make this democratic ideal look archaically quaint.
Accountability is becoming a matter of routinized suspicion, while instruments of control seek to make the actions of individuals and agencies both visible and verifiable. I will be examining this trend in the field of professional and elite sport, focusing specifically on doping controls, though I think it would be erroneous to assume that this is unique to the sporting arena. As Grix argues, convincingly in my view, sport and sport policy can 'shed light on developments in politics and policy more broadly ' (2010a, p. 160, also 2010b) .
Examples of routinized suspicion in the wider context might be seen from ongoing state reforms. Public sector employees are governed increasingly through managed and measured performance, while welfare recipients have been recoded as job-seekers, with benefits conditional on the individual's willingness to provide evidence that she or he is not shirking and is actively committed to the work ethic. This is happening in tandem with the neo-liberalisation of state and society, so that it would be a mistake to equate the new technologies of control with some sort of centralised state power. In other words, this is not Orwell's Big Brother but something else entirely. In the first part of this article, Foucault's lectures on biopolitics are used to trace an outline of the 'enterprise society', which serves to situate developments in the arena of sport within the broader context of neoliberalism and 'interactive' or 'networked governance'. In part two the focus shifts to the contest between competition and control in the field of high-performance sport, which is examined as a mutually constitutive relation that creates a spiral of intensification. This is by no means a benign process, and it might serve as a warning concerning the future of liberal democracy.
The game of enterprise and the spirit of sport
Foucault's approach to the study of liberalism can be contrasted with the concerns of normative political theory in that the central question -which is stretched between past and present -is how liberal thought is made practical and technical. In terms of bringing this approach to bear on neoliberalism, it is tempting to make comparisons with nineteenth century laissez faire liberalism, thereby concluding that we are witnessing an historical reversal. Foucault forcefully rejects such a 'resurgence' thesis however (2008, p. 117 ). There is not space here to present his argument in detail, but an example might serve to clarify the central point: ordoliberalism in post-War Germany. The problem that preoccupied the ordoliberals was not that of determining the limits of legitimate state interference in the market, and neither was it a question of working out how the state could supervise a free market economy so as to minimize its harmful effects, whether this took the form of poverty or unemployment. In the wake of Nazism, and in response to growing state interventionism in the US (Roosevelt's New Deal) and Britain (Beveridge's plan for a welfare state), the ordoliberals adopted a perspective described by Foucault as 'state-phobia', and this framed the problem of how to 'adopt the free market as organising and regulating principle of the state' (Foucault 2008, pp. 116, 187, emphasis added) . What this would eventually amount to in practice is now thoroughly familiar, because it has since become an axiom of neoliberal rule. In short, if classical liberalism assumes the market to be a quasinatural realm of spontaneity, then what distinguishes neoliberalism is an understanding of competition as a mechanism that must be 'carefully and artificially constructed' (Foucault in a world of generalised competition' (Dardot and Laval 2013, pp. 3-4, 302, original emphasis) . Furthermore, and to come back to Foucault's rejection of the resurgence thesis, generalised competition is not simply about stretching the logic of the market over the entirety of social and economic life. The enterprise society also institutes controls that reach into the micro-political realm of (inter-) subjectivity, thereby regulating not only the game itself, but also the actions of those who play the game of enterprise.
In what follows I place these initial reflections in the context of the ordinary as opposed to the extraordinary (such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers), i.e. the excesses of enterprise tends to be framed as though this amounts to exceptional and thus governable conduct or behaviour, but this overlooks the extent to which competition in the enterprise society is in fact a game of excess. More specifically, the analysis focuses on the issue of performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) in the world of professional sport, which offers insight into how practices and technologies that attempt to govern the excesses of innovation and enterprise may be instituting a despotic form of neoliberal rule, i.e. tyranny absent a tyrant.
Governing the excesses of enterprise
Whether in the athletic arena or on the battlefield, the use of stimulants and substances to dull pain and/or enhance strength, aggression and endurance can be traced back through the centuries to the ancient world, and it is only very recently that there has been a concerted attempt to prohibit the use of such substances -at least in the world of sport (Houlihan 1999; Waddington and Smith 2009 (Thompson 2008, pp. 231-2) . Anti-doping laws soon followed, and two central concerns have since shaped this field of discourse. One is that PEDs are harmful to the health of athletes, and the other is that the use of drugs confers an unfair advantage over athletes who compete 'clean'. There is also however a third and more recent justification for condemning the use of PEDs: the 'spirit of sport', which is how the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) enters the frame of analysis.
WADA might be seen as an example of what was referred to earlier, from Foucault, as a regulatory framework that attempts to govern the excesses of enterprise. As Hanstad, Smith and Waddington (2008) (2009, p. 14) , and yet when the value of anything less than winning is diminished to the point where participation counts for little (more on this below), then it must be conceded that doping is hardly extrinsic to the spirit of enterprise (see Henne 2014) . The game of enterprise rewards innovators, those who gain the edge over rivals and play to win. This is not to say that playing the game in this way does not also give rise to excesses. It clearly does, which is why we are witnessing novel attempts to tighten control -indeed WADA would not exist otherwise -but this increases the pressure to innovate. In other words, oil containing Andriol (a form of testosterone) and 'dispensing it to others', a claim which is followed by the speculative assertion that it is 'highly likely' that he used testosterone in the Tour de France that year (USADA 2012a, pp. 49-50, 58, 66-7, 75 ).
Given what is now known about the pervasiveness of EPO and other PEDs in professional cycling since the early 1990s, it is very difficult to envision scenarios that differ markedly from these accounts, that is, PEDs shared among teammates (or indeed friends from rival teams) and/or distributed within teams. Thus if USADA's interpretation of trafficking and administration in the Armstrong case was applied across the board, then it might be expected that lifetime bans would occur with much greater frequency than is actually the case. There is something exceptional about the treatment of Armstrong, something that singles him out as warranting extraordinary punishment. If this cannot be explained as the impartial application of the Code, then perhaps it is a targeted attempt to break the grip of Omertà in the world of professional cycling. This is certainly implied in USADA's (2012b) claim that Armstrong failed to avail of the opportunity to join his former colleagues in confessing in exchange for a reduced sentence, which is provisioned for in the Code. It has also been argued that Armstrong became a trophy for an anti-doping movement determined to demonstrate its efficacy (see Dimeo 2014) . But these are at most partial answers.
USADA brought the full weight of the Code to bear on Armstrong because of his role in orchestrating a conspiracy. Yet the idea of a doping conspiracy is itself a type of code which is programmed by the logic of 'enterprise'. The magnitude of the sanction applied to
Armstrong is the key to unlocking this code, and what I want to suggest is that this can only be done by emplacing the Armstrong case in the context of excess mentioned earlier. This is an excess that extends the boundaries of the sporting contest so that the game is played through a combination of cunning and intelligence, or in the vernacular of neoliberalism, through the fusion of innovation and enterprise. Before proceeding further, I wish to stress that I am not attempting to defend or absolve Armstrong. My concern here is not the question of guilt or innocence, but the extent to which Armstrong-the-athlete was the centrepiece of a successful enterprise. calculation, an example being the way he measured his food-intake against energyexpenditure to ensure an optimal ratio between body weight and power output (Armstrong 2001, p. 65) . This attitude also applied to kit and equipment, and in his determination to gain the competitive edge over rivals, Armstrong adopted a Formula One approach to hardware, bringing his sponsors together in a bid to coordinate research, to combine the best of what was technically possible, and to integrate every item of kit and equipment so that it would function as a singular and seamless system (Albergotti and O'Connell 2013) .
Dialling the numbers
When he was introduced to the sports doctor Michele Ferrari in 1995 (a relationship notably absent from his autobiography), Armstrong met a kindred spirit -someone who was fluent in the numerical language of performance, and who used this language to code his clients so that the athlete became a spread-sheet of numbers representing body-weight, fat-percentage, wattage (power output), and haematocrit (red blood cell count). Ferrari also came up with the magic number of 6.7, or 6.7 watts of power per kilo of body weight, which was what was required, according to his calculations, to win the Tour de France (Hamilton and Coyle 2012, p. 104) . Hitting that target required highly structured training, careful attention to the smallest details regarding equipment and nutrition, and also pharmacological assistance, and Ferrari was innovative when it came to staying ahead of doping controls.
In the past the drugs used by racing cyclists were either stimulants or pain suppressants, but the arrival of erythropoietin (EPO) from the late 1980s proved to be a game changer. Developed as an anti-anaemic drug to treat renal failure, AIDS, and cancer, EPO is used by cyclists to boost their oxygen-carrying capacity, in effect enriching the body's 'fuel' by delivering more oxygen to the muscles (Venables 2013) . Used in conjunction with human growth hormone, testosterone, and cortisone, EPO enables racing cyclists to train harder and recover faster, thereby increasing speed, endurance and peak power output.
Armstrong used the full spectrum of PEDs, and when a test for EPO was finally developed, Subsequent to Armstrong's interview on the Oprah Winfrey Network (in January 2013), where he publically confessed to using PEDs, SCA Promotions (among others) filed a lawsuit to recover the bonus money paid to Armstrong: he cheated to win the Tour, and thus he cheated SCA. But it might also be noted that SCA took the bet because it was believed the odds were in the company's favour. SCA is contesting how the game was played, not the game itself, and the excesses of the Armstrong case resonate with other manifestations generally tagged as 'scandals' and 'crises', including the sub-prime mortgage induced financial crisis, the News International phone-hacking scandal, and the horse-meatin-beef-burgers 'food fraud' controversy that rocked Europe in 2013. I am not saying these issues are equivalent, and I am certainly not condoning the behaviours that precipitated them. My point is that these are the excesses of enterprise. Further to this, that the SCA controversy relates to a bicycle race is all but incidental; this could be any number of commercial ventures. When the game is all about winning, then the most talented, driven and ruthless contestants are likely to prevail, and in the absence of talent ruthlessness may well serve to compensate. Either way, being an ethical player does not necessarily confer an advantage. Adding to the complexity of the problem is the diffuse organisational structure of the Armstrong enterprise, which was made possible by a complex network of expertise, goals and interests. It is here that an (admittedly uncomfortable) answer is to be found concerning Armstrong's 'life sentence' which, as noted above, is predicated on the idea of a doping conspiracy. What is unique to the Armstrong case is the extent to which it embarrassed the 'spirit of sport' by taking hold of the excesses that inhabit this normative ideal -excesses which are tolerated, even encouraged within certain limits -and putting them to work by dispensing with the notion of limits altogether. In other words, what the networked athlete did in this case was to take the 'spirit of enterprise' to its logical conclusion by turning the unsavoury aspects of competition into a successful venture: a winning blend of innovation and organisation.
Now that Armstrong has admitted to doping his way to sporting success, it would appear that USADA's reliance on circumstantial and hearsay evidence has been vindicated.
Similarly, the journalists who courted controversy by leading the hunt for Armstrong while he was still the sport's golden boy can now claim a moral victory. But as Møller and Dimeo (2014) have noted in analysing the case of Danish cyclist Michael Rasmussen 5 , there are real dangers attached to trying individuals in the court of public opinion on the strength of rumour, suspicion and inconclusive evidence, foremost among them the way in which this institutes a 'credibility contest' (also Møller 2011 Møller , 2014 . The next section situates this idea of a credibility contest in the context of an emerging apparatus of control.
Technologies of control
As indicated above, historical continuities notwithstanding, EPO and blood doping have shifted the boundaries of performance enhancement, and with teams and riders looking for ways to gain an edge over rivals, this transition from 'low octane' to 'high octane' drugs has been described by analysts and athletes alike as an 'arms race' (Benson 2013 PEDs such as EPO are detectable for only a limited period of time in the athlete's body while the performance-enhancing effects last for much longer, and the Whereabouts system is both a means of conducting out-of-competition testing and a panoptic technology, that is, the regulation of self-regulation 6 (Foucault 1977; also Park 2005) . Moreover, WADA's initiative to retain blood and urine samples for up to eight years reinforces panoptic power by enjoining athletes to bring the future into the realm of present calculations, because they must anticipate the likelihood of new tests being developed (Møller and Dimeo 2014, p. 265) . Athletes hooked into the Whereabouts system are thus subject to controls that are stretched between past and future, while the technique of out-of-competition testing works at the threshold of possibility and probability. There is a graphic portrayal of this in Alex Gibney's (2013) documentary The Armstrong lie. The scene in question depicts Armstrong, at home, giving blood and urine on two consecutive mornings to control officers from the UCI and USADA. On the first morning blood is drawn and sealed in front of Armstrong's young daughters, one of whom asks 'why are you taking blood daddy?' to which he replies 'for my job'. On the second morning Armstrong's composure in front of the camera gives way to anger, which is palpable as he stares down the doping-control officers and exclaims 'this is fucking ridiculous'. Here is a side of the credibility contest generally hidden from public view, and the fact that Armstrong is now known to have cheated does not alter the problematic nature of this mode of control, meaning the extent to which it overrides civil and human rights relating to privacy (Houlihan, 2004; Schneider 2004 ).
This leads into two other features of the Whereabouts apparatus worth noting. One is the way it reconfigures sanctions, because guilt -testing positive -is no longer the sole basis of punishment. Breaching the rules counts as a violation of the Code, with Article 2.4 of the Code stipulating that athletes can be sanctioned for 'any combination of three missed tests and/or failure to provide accurate whereabouts information within an eighteen-month period' (WADA 2012a; for a detailed critical analysis see Møller 2011 ). The second feature, which exemplifies panoptic power, is that the Whereabouts game is framed as a 'flexible tool' that enables 'top-level athletes to show their commitment to doping-free sport'
(WADA 2012a). Otherwise put, this is a form of contractual governance that insists on the voluntary acceptance of imposed obligations 7 (Crawford 2003) . In assessing this coercive dimension of the anti-doping apparatus, Møller (2014, p. 937 ) uses Rousseau's The social contract as an authoritative source in arguing that 'voluntary and willed consent' ought to be 'the foundation for people's obligation to obey legislation'. It is not that Møller's normative orientation is flawed, but Rousseau might be more usefully employed in staging a critique of intrusive anti-doping controls. Rousseau's conception of the social contract spanned the rule of law and the 'general will', and he insisted that those who deviate from the voluntary and willed consent invoked by Møller must be 'forced to be free' (Rousseau 1968, p. 64) . Doping controls force athletes to be free in accordance with 'democratic' principles of transparency and accountability, and the credibility contest requires at least the outward appearance of voluntary consent, because to question these controls is to invite suspicion. I will return to this point in the conclusion with examples of how imposedvoluntary-compliance is publically staged as a way of demonstrating commitment to WADA's 'collaborative worldwide campaign for doping-free sport'. Suffice for now to note that the upshot of this is that athletes claim credibility for themselves by affirming the legitimacy of intrusive controls, even in situations -such as the one described abovewhere the athlete questions their validity. First however I want to briefly review two other instruments of control: the Biological Passport and the ADAMS.
The Biological Passport is an electronic document that records test results -blood and urine samples acquired through in-competition and out-of-competition testing -and plots these over time, establishing a baseline that can be used to detect deviations from the individual's 'normal' range of values. In his analysis of this instrument, Fouché (2009) notes the significance of the word 'passport', which more typically serves to regulate the movement of people across state borders. The Biological Passport is similar in that it governs access to the sporting arena. It also moves the 'enforcement location' of clean athletic performance deeper into the scientific laboratory and further into the realm of information technology, in effect 'black boxing' the policing of athletes through the use of increasingly sophisticated diagnostic tools combined with the specialised knowledge required to interpret and analyse the data (Fouché 2009, p. 98) . Sluggett (2011, p. 388 ) has also examined this trend whereby doping controls shift from detecting the presence of banned substances to documenting indications of abnormal biological values, and he interprets this as an ongoing 'drugs detection game'. Anti-doping authorities try to develop tests for otherwise undetectable drugs, while athletes try to stay one step of the testing regime by looking for new ways of enhancing performance, so that the game becomes an 'escalating spiral of resistance and counter-attack'.
Interfacing with the Whereabouts system, the Biological Passport makes the old binary logic of guilt versus innocence all but obsolete by dispensing with the inertia of the old system (an inconclusive test) and transforming suspicion into a quantifiable risk that can be translated into targeted actions (Sluggett 2011) . This is how the ADAMS comes into play.
WADA describes this as a 'web-based database management system' that stores and collates information relating to athlete whereabouts, biological profile, Therapeutic Use
Exemptions ( Waddington and Smith argue the point that this machinery 'reinstates and intensifies policies which have a long history of failure ' (2009, p. 206) . These controls may well be failing to eradicate doping in sport, but they also have a constitutive effect in the way they intensify the contest. There is symmetry between the techniques employed by the enhanced athlete -the athlete plugged into networks of interests and expertise -and the authorities attempting to control the use of PEDs, in that both sides of the relation meet as allies and rivals in a tactical game of enterprise and innovation (see Mignon 2003) .
Furthermore, this is an intensely reflexive process that blurs the boundaries of control. For example, the science used to enhance performance is also used to control performance enhancement, and some of the same pharmaceutical and biotech companies that design and develop the drugs used to boost performance also work in partnership with anti-doping authorities (Slugget 2011; Henne 2014) . To borrow from Dardot and Laval (2013, pp. 260-1), this 'entrepreneurial governmentality' is constituted through a series of folds: anti-doping authorities are engaged in a struggle to control the 'excessive' behaviour of athletes, who in turn compete in a race to gain an edge over rivals, so that the game of enterprise becomes an on-going contest that continues to intensify, and this has profound implications in terms of how it reconfigures the practice of freedom.
Conclusion: freedom, transparency and accountability in the enterprise society
In the midst of the 2013 Bastille Day celebrations in France, there was a curious yet predictable episode on the steep slopes of Mont Ventoux in Provence. It was stage fifteen of the one-hundredth edition of the Tour de France and an estimated 500,000 spectators lined the roadside, transforming the mountain into a stadium. A British rider, Christopher
Froome, was in the coveted yellow jersey of race leader, and when he seemed to defy gravity with a blistering attack near the summit the crowd did not react by shouting encouragement or applauding his effort. Instead there was an eruption of whistles and jeers. Despite the fact that Froome had never tested positive for PEDs he was being accused of cheating 8 . This reaction to extraordinary displays of athletic performance is indicative of the pervasiveness of suspicion which, as suggested in the introduction, is an embedded feature of the enterprise society. But it is also the case that being suspect affords an opportunity to demonstrate one's commitment to 'playing true'. Froome's response to public scepticism is instructive here: he staged a counter-attack by surrendering his power data to L'Equipe and the French physiologist Frederic Grappe for independent analysis (Farrand 2013) . Later in the season, Chris Horner followed suit by making his Biological Passport available for public scrutiny (Beaudin 2013 Benson 2014a Benson , 2014b . This is like swearing allegiance to a tyrannical form of transparency which, as Møller has argued (2004) , institutes a juridical practice that seems more at home in the medieval world in that it condemns those who fail to clear themselves of suspicion.
Moreover, if evidence is required of the game of enterprise as a mode of subjectivation, then this may well be it.
Whether in sport or politics, governing authorities continue to play the game of control, but the excesses of the enterprise society cannot be explained as the absence of control, or even as a deficit of control. The problem is control itself (Deleuze 1992) . Control is welded to competition, but not as a means to some greater end -some noble cause or vision of human progress. Instead the game of enterprise serves the end of more competition, more control, more transparency and accountability, which in practical terms means measuring, counting and ranking things in finer detail and with greater precision.
When winning is everything then the contest becomes a game of excess, which leads to a tightening of controls, which in turn leads to innovation in order to gain an edge over rivals in pursuit of success, and so the contest between competition and control continues to intensify. I have tried to show that this is the lesson to be taken from the world of professional and elite sport, but the Olympic ethos of Citius, Altius, Fortius is by no means confined to athletic contests. There are many competitive arenas where contestants play a game of excess in pursuit of success, and while discourses of innovation and enterprise tend to invoke the idea of ethical and collaborative undertakings that pave the way for breakthroughs in cancer treatment and clean energy, this is like saying that the true value of sport comes from participation, whereas in fact everyone knows this to be a joke, or a lie, or at best a commendable ideal. Cheating may be contrary to the spirit of sport, but looking for an edge in the quest for success is an intrinsic feature of the enterprise society -this is the spirit of enterprise. When the game is a matter of winning-at-all-costs, then for most it is not even a contest because there can only be one winner, and the majority struggle simply to stay in the game. Furthermore, when the pool of talent is bigger than the requirements of the organisation, company or team, which it generally is, then it becomes imperative to find a way to stand out, and ethics are likely to be swept aside by the urgency of finding a way to stay in the game.
To be governed in the name of accountability and transparency is to be measured and ranked through comparison to others, and where one stands in the resulting hierarchy is by no means inconsequential, which is perhaps why so many of us are willing to measure and rank ourselves, and by default, each other. In a situation of generalised competition we are all contestants, and if we are to win recognition as the best, or at least not fall too far behind, then we must constantly strive to rise above the rest, and thus the game of enterprise is like a ratchet that tightens the relation between competition and control, thereby intensifying inequality. But it must be acknowledged that this is also a game of opportunity, and we are persistently reminded of this through the use of metrics and other forms of audit: accounting machines that transform actions into enumerated hierarchies of winners and losers. For those lagging behind the leaders it may well be a game of survival (Clegg 2005) , but if the game is experienced by some as a fear of failure, for others it is a game of prospects. Either way, this is freedom in the enterprise society. and 11pm (WADA 2012a).
7. The contentious issue of 'non-voluntary' consent to doping-controls, and also the extent to which the current system might be challenged on human rights grounds, was discussed at the working athlete's meeting in Switzerland in 2011 (see Møller 2014) .
8. During the press conference at the end of the stage, Froome also faced accusations from journalists (video available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ay48ZWkoeHU).
